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Abstract(
This project rests on the assumption that the Cold War is still relevant in international politics 
today. The latest development in Ukraine is an example of this - the EU and Russia is fighting for 
influence in a state that is not part of either of their territory. This project focuses on the 2004 
enlargement of the European Union (EU). The theoretical frame of this project is based on the book 
“Theory of International Politics” by the neo-realist Kenneth Waltz. The EU is treated as an actor 
with state-like features, since the theory primarily focuses on state behaviour. With the theory in 
mind, the aim of this project is to trace balancing tendencies in relation to the 2004 enlargement. 
The primary data of the analysis consists of official EU documents from 1992-2004, which are all 
connected to the enlargement. Consequently, the focus is primarily on the EU. The analysis is 
structured through coding inspired by the capabilities that Waltz has established, and each of the 
coding themes is linked with a hypothesis. In this project, the analysis therefore looks for balancing 
tendencies in the following themes: people and territory, security, political stability and economy. 
The result of this analysis is that balancing tendencies can be traced in all four areas. These findings 
are further developed in a discussion that traces the perspectives from the analysis in the period 
after 2004.  
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1. Problem Area 
“It is up to Ukraine to freely decide what kind of engagement they seek 
with the European Union. Ukrainian citizens have again shown these 
last days that they fully understand and embrace the historic nature of 
the European association. We therefore strongly disapprove of the 
Russian   position   and   actions   in   this   respect”   (European Commission, 
2013). 
These are the words of the President of the European Commission José Manuel 
Barroso and the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, who in a 
joint statement on the 25th of November 2013 addressed the situation in Ukraine. 
Ukraine was at one point ready to the sign a trade- and association-agreement with the 
European Union (EU), but an extensive trade-agreement with Russia is still on the 
table. Seemingly both EU and Russia are very interested in tying closer connections 
with the Eastern European state, and throughout the fall of 2013 both powers have 
been accusing each other of foul play. This tug of war over Ukraine brings thoughts to 
mind of a divided Europe that supposedly was long gone.  
The assumption that the Cold War was over with the events in 1989 is the general 
understanding of world history today. But is this assumption really true? One might 
argue that features of the Cold War are still observable in global politics at this very 
moment in time – the current situation in Ukraine exemplifies this. It is commonly 
known that history is important to take into consideration, when analysing state action 
in the complex field of International Relations (IR). From this perspective, one can 
simply not ignore the historical aspects of the conflict between the hegemons that 
emerged after the Second World War, notably the US and the Soviet Union. 
However, the world also witnessed the rise of a new global actor after 1945. The 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community 
(ECC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were established in 
order to reduce the risk of rearmament and subsequent war (Wallace et. al., 2010: 4-
12). The idea was that states should be interdependent of one another, because of 
increased cooperation and production in the new institutional set up – especially 
within the steel and coal industry. Thus, increased cooperation and trade would make 
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it unlikely for European states to go to war with each other, since it would basically 
be too costly for them to do so. Ever since the 1950s, the three communities have 
continuously developed and expanded over time and consequently merged in to what 
today has come to be known as the EU. In December 2003, the European Security 
Strategy  (ESS)  named  ‘A  Secure  Europe  in  a  Better  World’  stated  that: 
“Europe   has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The 
violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of 
peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of 
the European Union has been central to this development”   (European 
Security Council, 2003: 1). 
Throughout this merging process, European integration has been an incontestable fact 
and states within the European continent have certainly been tied closer together, as a 
result of various policies. It can surely be debated, whether this development is for the 
better or not. However, it is not for this project to decide. As clearly stated in Article 2 
in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the relationship between EU member states 
is bound up on values such as: the respect for freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and human rights (Official Journal of the European Union, 2010) - all of which 
are values that liberalists within IR theory acknowledge as important for stability, 
peace and security. 
The liberal institutional project of the EU has led to processes of turning former 
authoritarian and anti-democratic states into peaceful and homogenous democratic 
entities, which share the same basic values and thus are able to cooperate peacefully 
with one another, without having to worry about scenarios of violent conflict. Many 
of the states that have been through this transformation recently are Eastern European 
countries, most of which have historical ties to the former Soviet Union. In the 2004 
enlargement of the EU, countries like Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the 
Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) all became members of the European 
community in the single largest expansion of the EU to this date (Sedelmeier, 2010: 
404). With the fall of the communist Soviet Union these states were determined to 
accommodate to EU core values and they gradually started to loosen ties to their 
historical superiors - the Russians. Realists within IR theory would describe this 
transformation  as  a  change  in  ‘balance  of  power’.   
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Even though balancing always takes place in the anarchic world of sovereign states 
according to realist thinking, the tip in balance in relation to the continuous EU 
member state enlargement is probably be more significant than one would recognise 
at first glance. While the EU might not have expanded with the sole purpose of 
changing the balancing structure of between themselves and Russia, one should not 
deny that there could be underlying motives in the expansion, which we might not be 
aware of. One of these motives could be to place the EU in a stronger position in the 
international system of competing powers, hence to tip the scale in terms of power 
balancing.   With   that   being   said,   it   has   to   be   noted   that   ‘balance   of   power’   is   a  
disputed term. When determining whether and how balancing takes place between 
actors, a lot of variables have to be taken into account. Kenneth Waltz, one of the 
most acknowledged neo-realists within this field, recognises that it is useful to include 
additional factors other than just pure military strength, when determining balance of 
power. In this relation, Waltz points out that the power of states also is determined by: 
size of population and territory, resources, economic capability and political stability 
(Waltz 1979: 131). In other words, military strength is not alpha omega when 
determining the balance of power, albeit it is a vital measure in many cases.  
If we assume that the federal system of the EU is transforming into a structure with 
state-like features, it will misleading to take every single member country into 
account, when conducting research on the foreign and security policies of the Union. 
With this in mind, we should rather view the EU as a consistent and harmonised unit, 
acting more or less in coherence when dealing with issues concerning power relations 
in an international perspective. Even though the military capacity and the ability to act 
unilaterally when dealing with military concerns is limited in the EU, we have to 
acknowledge that the EU is a resourceful entity when we take aspects of political 
stability and economic capability into consideration. While the EU is often forgotten 
in the realist analysis of competing hegemons fighting for dominance in the ever-
changing uni- and bipolar world order, we still believe that the EU is vital to observe 
from a balance of power perspective - especially in a regional setting. With the EU 
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expansions of 2004 as a clear-cut example of successful European integration, we find 
it useful to observe tendencies of balancing since the dissolution of the Soviet Union1.  
This had led to the following problem formulation: 
Which balancing tendencies can be traced in the process leading up to the 2004 
enlargement of the European Union?  
                                                        1 By “tendency”  is  meant  the  disposition  of  a  development  to  proceed  in  a  specific direction. We see it 
both as a development over time, but also as a specific topic being particularly present. 
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2. Methodology 
In this section the methodological reflections of this project will be presented. These 
include thoughts on philosophy of science, empirical data with a presentation of the 
primary documents, and the limitations of the project. 
2.1 Philosophy of science 
The methodology of this project is primarily based on critical rationalism. Shortly put, 
the premise of critical rationalism is that the area of research and its properties exist 
independently from the researcher. The truth exists, but one can never be sure if the 
truth is found. The purpose of science is therefore to come as close to the actual 
features of the specific subject as possible (even though one can never be sure if this 
is accomplished). This is possible to achieve through setting up hypotheses and 
testing them over and over again. If the theory survives the tests the more precise it 
must be, and if not the theory needs to be modified and tested again. (Koch in 
Fuglsang and Olsen, 2004: 80ff). The critical rationalist thought also presupposes that 
theory and data are connected in the sense that data is charged with theory. This 
means that data is given value, when theory is applied. Having theory in mind in the 
initial work with the data-collection, does not mean that the result of the research has 
been established – the theory merely structures the researches hunt for relevant 
empirical data (Koch in Fuglsang and Olsen, 2004: 96-97). Usually this philosophy of 
science is connected to quantitative method, but we find is useful when working with 
qualitative data as well.  
In practice this means that we take on a hypothetical deductive method. We have 
assumptions about balancing tendencies in connection to the 2004 enlargement of the 
European Union (EU) (these are naturally tightly connected to the theory of this 
project and will therefore be described in detail in our chapter on this). These 
assumptions will be the background for four hypotheses that will be tested through 
analysis of various documents from the EU. Since the hypotheses and the theory are 
closely connected our hypotheses will be presented in the theoretical chapter.  
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2.2 The Empirical Data  
The empirical body of this project consists of official documents from the EU made 
up of various types, such as declarations, meeting summaries, speeches and country 
reports. Even though they differ in form, the common feature is that they are all 
somehow connected to the process leading up to the 2004 enlargement of the EU. 
With a focus on the process, it is important that the documents collectively cover the 
period from the first Eastern European applications for membership and up until the 
enlargement. That is why our selected main documents are spread over a period of 11 
years from 1993 to 2004. 
The choice of working with documents in the first place stems from the research 
question. We wish to uncover tendencies of balancing, and not just the absolute 
capabilities (cf. Theoretical Framework). If we were to measure the absolute 
capabilities of the EU and Russia from the collapse of the Soviet Union and up until 
2004, important angles would be left out, and come across some methodological 
pitfalls as well. Take for instance military spending, a point crucial to many realists. If 
a state experiences economic growth, the percentage of the GDP that is used on 
military will fall even though the absolute figure has not. Just looking at the numbers 
can thereby create blurred results, which takes a vast amount of work to unravel the 
relevant meaning of. Furthermore, being oriented towards the balancing tendencies by 
looking purely at the measureable development of capabilities does not provide the 
necessary data. 
The specific documents that we have chosen of course stems from the research 
question. With our research question in mind, the documents have therefore been 
chosen from the pool of documents connected with our four hypotheses and 
enlargement. Through the process of choosing the empirical data, extensive amounts 
of documents have been looked through. Eight primary documents came out of this 
process, while we have a number of secondary documents to supplement (as 
explained later in this chapter). These will be used in the analysis. In the discussion 
we will elaborate on the results from the analysis by using various new documents, 
among them academic articles. 
To get a grip of the documents chosen for the analysis we operationalise our 
hypothesis through coding. The chosen documents holds information relevant for this 
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specific project, but also contain information that is not as relevant. Coding therefore 
provides a focus in the extensive documents, but equally important made it possible to 
expose the connection between them. Since our documents are of different types and 
also set differently in time, coding creates a collected body of empirical data. From 
the initial readings of potential empirical data, and with inspiration from the 
theoretical foundation of this project, we have structured our coding in the following 
themes: territory and population, security, political stability and economy. These 
themes encompass the features that we expect to play a role in the 2004 enlargement, 
and are inspired by the five capabilities that Waltz sets up for measuring the relative 
power of states (cf. Theoretical Framework). However, as described above, we do not 
seek to measure the level of the five capabilities within EU, but the terms can in our 
mind be used in qualitative research as well. These terms will be thoroughly described 
in our chapter on theory, since theory and coding are tightly connected. Here, we will 
also describe the hypotheses that are set up for each coding theme. 
2.2.1 The documents 
The documents used have, as mentioned above, been divided into primary and 
secondary documents. This classification is not, as usual when using those phrases, 
tied up to the source of the document but to the relevance of the content. The primary 
documents are ones that have a strong connection to the 2004 enlargement within the 
scope of this project, and for that reason they have been thoroughly processed and 
coded. The secondary documents should be understood as supplementary documents 
with a weaker connection. This classification was made after coding of all documents. 
Below all documents with a primary function will be elaborated on. 
The European Council, Copenhagen, 21-22nd of June 1993: The presidency 
conclusions from a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen. It is the meeting 
were the Copenhagen criteria where set up, and it therefore contains both visions and 
more practical thoughts on future enlargement. Besides that it contains thoughts on 
the relationship with Russia. 
French-British Summit Declaration, Saint-Malo, 3-4th of December 1998: A joint 
declaration from the meeting of the heads of state of France and the United Kingdom. 
The  agenda  is  the  future  of  EU’s  security  position, and the two countries agreed that 
the EU needed further development in this field. We incorporate this document 
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because France and the United Kingdom are two great powers within the EU, and 
their opinions play a role in the community. 
Cologne European Council, 3-4th of June 1999: The presidency conclusion of a 
European Council meeting in Cologne, where, amongst other things, the agenda is the 
future of a common European policy on security and defence. The document 
welcomes the declaration from the Franco-British meeting in 1998. The status of the 
2004 enlargement is also described. 
Western European Union – Luxembourg Declaration, Luxembourg, 22-23rd of 
November 1999: This document is a declaration from a WEU-meeting in 
Luxembourg, where the readiness to transfer the security competences from WEU to 
the EU is discussed.  
Speech by Javier Solana on CFSP, Berlin, 14th of November 2000: A speech by Javier 
Solana, the former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), at the Forschunginstitut der Deutschen Gesellshaft für Auswärtige Politik in 
Berlin. He describes the role of the EU in security-matters by focusing on the CFSP. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council on Kaliningrad Transit, 18th of 
September 2002: This paper presents a study on the possibilities for a solution of the 
transit of persons and goods to and from Kaliningrad. 
 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, 12-13th of December 2002: 
The conclusions from a council meeting in Copenhagen where the ten new member 
countries of 2004 were on the agenda. The document entails the conclusions on the 
negotiations and agreements with these countries. 
A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12th of 
December 2003: A document written under the authority of Javier Solana, at the time 
EU's High Representative for the CFSP, describing the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), which was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. It draws up 
the security challenges of the Union. 
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2.3 Limitations  
This project takes on the perspective of the EU, thereby leaving the Russian 
perspective on process leading up to the enlargement out. This choice has been made 
mostly due to interest and sheer practicality. Doing a side-by-side analysis 
encompassing the two actors is quite extensive and perhaps too extensive for a 
thorough analysis within the given timeframe. The major issue has been whether we 
would be able to get hold of relevant documents representing the Russian perspective 
and whether these would be available in English. However, the fact that the EU was 
the instigator in the 2004 enlargement makes the EU-perspective relevant. In 
connection to this, it is important to mention that this project has a focus on the gains 
that the EU achieves with the enlargement. 
The choice of empirical data in general is also worth mentioning as a limitation or 
challenge to this project. All the documents that we have access to are official 
documents, and many of them have been labelled as documents for the press. This 
definitely challenges our work, since the contents and formulations most likely will be 
diplomatic,   and   not   necessarily   equal   to   the   actual   opinions   of   the   document’s  
authors.  The   view  put   forward  will   very  much   be  EU’s   own   interpretation of itself 
placing the Union in positive light.   
On top of that, the EU is a difficult entity because of the various actors within. We see 
the chosen documents for what they are: official statements from EU as a whole. This 
lines up with our standpoint of treating the EU analytically as a collective actor with 
state-like features. (cf. Theoretical Framework).  This means that speeches made by 
top figures, such as Javier Solana, High Representative of the CFSP at the time of 
many of the documents, or the leaders of the member states holding chairmanship of 
the Union at a given moment, represents the official attitude of the EU. In this 
connection, it should be noted that opinions in documents from the European Union 
Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) are also seen as official statements of the EU. 
The  EUISS  is  an  autonomous  body  under  the  CFSP.  Still,  it  is  the  Union’s  agency  for  
analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. Furthermore, the EUISS 
activities are funded by the Union. 
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3. Theoretical Framework  
The following chapter will present the theoretical framework of the project, which is 
mainly based on the neo-realist views of Kenneth Waltz presented in his book 
“Theory  of  International  Politics”  from  1979.  More  specifically,  focus  will be on the 
structure of the international system and the balance of power between states. 
Furthermore, this chapter will include arguments supporting an essential point in this 
project; that the European Union (EU) can be viewed as an actor with state-like 
features, and is therefore relevant when analysing balance of power. The chapter will 
end with four hypotheses, which will serve as the basis for our analysis. 
3.1 Anarchy and Balance of Power 
The theory of anarchic orders and balance of power, as described by Kenneth Waltz, 
is an explanatory theory inspired by economic models that aims at setting up a 
scientific explanation of international politics. Inspired elements of classical and 
neoclassical realist thinking, Waltz stresses the importance of states as unitary actors 
within international relations (IR), but even more so the structure of the international 
system as a whole. This theoretical focus on the state as a unitary actor differs from 
that of other branches of neorealist such as John J. Mearsheimer. Waltz strongly 
believes that the balance of power theory is not constructed to foresee foreign policy 
measures being taken by one state, but rather observe the balancing response of states 
to changes in the structure of the international system. Morgenthau and others in the 
continuing theoretical debate of balance of power theory disagrees with Waltz and 
puts stronger emphasis on the theories ability to take in to account or even explain the 
foreign policy being conducted by a individual states. (Waltz, 1979: 116-118, Little, 
2007: 235-236) 
As mentioned above, the balance of power theory is based on assumptions of state 
behaviour  within  the  international  system.  Waltz  describes  states  as  actors  “…who,  at  
a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal 
domination.” (Waltz, 1979: 118). 
Security is a crucial aspect in this line of thinking. Waltz focuses on the 
interdependence among states where cooperation for mutual gain implies a condition 
of insecurity. States are seen as units that constantly worry about their survival and 
this worry consequently affects their behaviour. As a result, states naturally become 
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focused on self-protection because they are insecure about the intentions of other state 
actors. Waltz states that “in a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate 
economic  gain  to  political  interest” (Waltz, 1979: 107). This self-help system is very 
much formed by the structures that are external to the actors - in particular the relative 
distribution of power. From this neorealist point of view, structures more or less 
determine the actions of states. 
The possibility of war and the insecurity of intentions, forces states to act for their 
own sake and rely on the means that they generate themselves – or as Waltz puts it: 
“self-help  is  necessarily  the  principle  of  action  in  an  anarchic  order”   (Waltz, 1979: 
111). States must maintain in control of their own affairs, e.g. by using force and thus 
force becomes a tool for their own interest. But the use of force can have implications 
with severe consequences since force might also be used elsewhere and the risk of 
war is thus a constant threat.  
In this structure of international anarchy and self-help, it is essential to note the 
‘balance   of   power’   between   states.  According to Waltz “balance-of-power politics 
prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic 
and   that   it   be   populated   by   units   wishing   to   survive” (Waltz, 1979: 121). In this 
setting, the balance of power theory seeks to explain how states act under the 
conditions given by the structure of the system. The objectives and motives may not 
be explicitly stated in the policies made by states, but one has to be aware that they 
are underlying features of state action (Waltz, 1979: 118). Balancing takes place in 
two  ways   from  this  point  of  view:  states  use   internal  balancing   i.e.   increasing  one’s  
own capabilities such as economic or military strength, and external balancing i.e. 
entering alliances with the aim of strengthening one’s  own  position  or   to  weaken  or  
lessen the power of an opposing one (Waltz, 1979: 118). The theory is built on 
assumptions of state action and state behaviour and ultimately the outcome, which is 
the formation of balances of power in the international structure. Waltz explains this 
theoretical idea in the following way: “balance-of-power theory is a theory about the 
results produced by uncoordinated actions of states. The theory makes assumptions 
about the interests and motives of states, rather than explaining  them”  (Waltz, 1979: 
122). Waltz argues that the assumptions are not necessarily factual, but the as long as 
they are useful in an analytical perspective, it does not matter whether they are true or 
not. The occurrence of a balance of power and the action of balancing is not 
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necessarily something that is apparent to the states; balancing takes place despite the 
fact that it is not always connected to a conscious decision of doing so (Waltz, 1979: 
119). Waltz argues that this mechanism is not present if all states are unwilling to 
preserve themselves. However, as long as one state drive to preserve itself it will keep 
the whole system going. Still, there are different views on what constitutes balancing. 
Christopher Layne focuses on how balancing takes place in practical terms. The 
traditional view on balancing is concerned with how units use military power and/or 
form alliances to challenge a dominating hegemon. However, Layne stresses that new 
forms   of   balancing,   such   as   “soft balancing”,   employ   non-military instruments of 
power. As Layne puts it: “”soft   balancing”   involves   the   use   of   diplomacy,  
international institutions, and international law to constrain and delegitimize the 
actions   of   a   [hegemon]”   (Layne, 2006: 8). In this view balancing is not primarily 
focused on military capabilities, but rather a range of different instruments, such as 
diplomacy etc.  
In relation to balance of power, Waltz stresses that states have to use their combined 
capabilities in the self-help system, in order to serve their own interests. States are 
thus seen in a ranking system, where the accumulated capabilities determine the 
power they possess. The capabilities are divided into different categories: size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence (Waltz, 1979: 131). States act by estimating one 
another’s   capabilities   based   on   assumptions.   All   these   capabilities   are   interlinked.  
Hence, the ranking of states is difficult to measure precisely. The balance of power 
between states is based on the assumptions of capabilities, which are constantly being 
estimated by state actors. Consequently, ranking of states is indirectly linked to the 
balance of power. In this project we have chosen to extract the categories found most 
relevant when examining the balance of power in light of the 2004 enlargement of the 
EU.  Based  on  Waltz’  presentation,  we  have  chosen  to  modify  these  based  on  what  we  
find relevant to our study. The capabilities in this project are:  
1. Population and Territory 
2. Security 
3. Political Stability 
4. Economic Capability 
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We  are   aware   that   the   second   capability   of   ‘security’   can   be   understood   in   various  
ways, since academic literature contains different interpretations of the term. Instead 
of focusing on military in the traditional sense, we have chosen to view how the EU 
has used security as part of its policy discourse since the Petersberg Declaration from 
1992. A main reason for this is that the EU has no common military, but rather a 
range of policies on foreign and security matters, such as the Common Foreign and 
Security   Policy   (CFSP).   This   is   also   in   line   with   Layne’s   view   on   soft   balancing,  
which stresses that military capability is not alpha-omega when focusing on 
balancing. In the following part, we will argue that the EU can be seen as an actor 
with state-like features, which allows us to analyse its capabilities. 
3.2 The European Union as a State-like Actor 
The EU federal system has evolved over time from being primarily concerned with 
internal matters of economic cooperation, to now being an actor with significant 
influence in international affairs. Throughout the years the EU have expanded its 
bureaucratic scope with a number of treaties, such as the Maastricht, Amsterdam and 
Nice treaties, and consequently gained more authority over domestic affairs like fiscal 
and regulatory policies. This increase in capacity leads to a higher degree of influence 
in international politics (Selden, 2010: 406-407).  
It is surely up for debate, whether the EU should be viewed as a state or not. In 
general terms, the state can be defined as:  
“a   territory-based socio-political organisation entrusted with the 
responsibility of defending basic social values, including security, freedom, 
order, justice and welfare.  […]  Though  states  differ  in  their  level  of  success  in  
the aforementioned values, the state is understood to have legal jurisdiction 
(sovereignty)   over   its   own   affairs   and   population”   (Jackson and Sørensen, 
2010: 307).  
This definition aligns with the traditional Westphalian view of what constitutes a 
modern sovereign state.  
But what constitutes a state from an international point of view? The EU is sometimes 
described as a normative power, because it acts primarily to change norms, and shape 
conceptions   of   what   is   ‘normal’   in   IR.   Thus,   the   EU   is   increasingly   exercising  
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normative power in order to redefine international norms trough its actions (Manners, 
2002: 240, 252). It is evident that the EU lacks powers associated with sovereign 
states. As an example, the Union has no direct power in taxation, and it does not 
solely control immigration policy or an independent military. Nevertheless, it is vital 
to note that the EU has a direct impact on issues that were previously the exclusive 
competency of its member states through its regulatory structure. While the EU may 
not be seen as a state in the traditional Westphalian sense, the EU is clearly an 
institution that has taken on many of the characteristics of a state (Selden, 2010: 407). 
According to Kluth and Pilegaard, the EU can be seen as a unit acting collectively, 
and not just as the disorganised sum of the actions of individual member states. This 
means that the EU is a unified actor, which encompasses features similar to that of a 
state, and whose general actions reflects the characteristics of the individual member 
states (Kluth and Pilegaard, 2011: 46). In this view, the EU is a complex entity made 
up of member states with individual international interests and perspectives, which 
still share a strong common perspective on issues of international security. While the 
EU may not have a completely similar structure to that of a nation-state, it does have 
the ability to articulate a common perspective and increasingly use coercive power to 
ensure that this perspective prevails. In this relation, Kluth and Pilegaard refers to 
Bretherton  and  Vogler’s  five  basic  requirements  of  actorness,  being: 
1. A shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles; 
2. The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; 
3. The ability to effectively negotiate with other actors in the international 
system; 
4. The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments, and 
5. Domestic legitimations of decision processes and priorities relating to 
external policy. (Kluth and Pilegaard, 2011: 48) 
Kluth and Pilegaard argue that the EU is very much in line with the requirements of 
determining what constitutes an actor (Kluth and Pilegaard, 2011: 48). The EU is 
therefore an actor able to make collective decisions, despite of the national interests of 
each individual member states. In other words, the EU is an actor with state-like 
features. 
16  
Waltz stresses the fact that the member states of the EU have successfully integrated 
their national economies and consequently increased their economic capabilities. In 
Waltz’   view,   the   EU   also   possesses   other   important   tools   for   determining   power,  
namely: population, resources, technology and military capabilities. However, the EU 
lacks the organisational ability and the collective will to use these effectively (Waltz, 
2000: 31). If the EU is to become a powerful actor in this sense, it has to develop 
successful and unified foreign and military policies similar to that of their economic 
achievements. According to Waltz, this has not been the case so far and therefore the 
EU will not be able to count as a significant actor in international politics as long as 
the EU is not able to make radical changes in these policy areas (Waltz, 2000: 31-32). 
In this view, the EU should not be seen as a great power as such. Neither should it be 
seen as an actor with features similar to that of a state.2 
Whitman very much aligns with the view of Waltz, stating that: 
“although   it   is  possible   to  aggregate   the  military,  economic  and  diplomatic 
capabilities of the 27 Member States to suggest that the EU is a putative 
superpower, the EU lacks a political decision-making infrastructure that 
would  enable  utilising  them”  (Whitman, 2010: 26).  
Like Waltz, Whitman argues that the EU face difficulties in acting collectively when 
dealing with issues of foreign and military policy. The EU has clearly developed its 
role in global politics throughout the last decades, but it still lacks the ability to 
mobilise member state capabilities for collective endeavours. Member states are still 
able to conduct their own national foreign policies and they often act for the sake of 
their own benefit. As Whitman notes: “it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that,  over  
16 years after the inception of the CFSP, the EU still lacks the skills and the will to 
act  effectively  in  the  sphere  of  ‘high  diplomacy’,  the  traditional  reserve  of  the  nation  
state” (Whitman, 2010: 28). Hence, the EU clearly does not posses the abilities to act 
coherently as a state, according to Whitman. Lacking consensus when dealing with 
issues of international politics makes the EU a weak diplomatic power in this view. 
                                                        
2 One has to be aware that the views of Waltz presented here were first published in 2000. The EU has 
developed a range of foreign and military policies since, such as the European Security Strategy (ESS), 
the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
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The EU thus needs to resolve its member state differences, if it wants to become a 
significant player in the international community. 
Nevertheless, this project aligns with the federalist view that the EU can be seen as an 
actor with a range of state-like features. Even though this view is controversial, we 
believe that the EU acts like a state from an IR perspective. State-centric realist 
scholars would of course disagree with this view, by arguing that the EU shall be seen 
as an alliance - not a state. However, we believe that this understanding it simply too 
narrowly focused, because the EU has developed its own capabilities and authority 
beyond that of its single member states. Realists, like the previously mentioned Waltz 
and Whitman, believes that the EU still lacks the ability to mobilise member states 
and make them act coherently when dealing with foreign or military issues. Still, we 
find it significant that the institutional development of the EU has allowed for 
consolidation of its authority over internal issues, in which member states pool their 
sovereignty and consequently leaves significant political influence in the hands of the 
EU itself. The institutions of the EU, such as the Council of Ministers, the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) foster 
cooperation between member states and also ensures that each country abide by the 
rules. Through the Council and the Parliament, the EU is able to legislate with 
implications for each member state, while the ECJ is able to sanction member states 
that do not comply with the rules of the EU. These states must respect the same 
fundamental values and rules, in order to take part in the political development of the 
European community. Increasing control and authority over internal matters, means 
that the EU is slowly becoming a more powerful and influential actor in IR – as 
opposed to what Whitman claims. As an example, the EU is now presented through 
the Commission at the G8-summits, where it has improved its standing and autonomy 
and now deals with a range of policy issues, which were formerly exclusive to the rest 
of the governments involved in the forum (Niemann and Huigens, 2011: 436). This 
point is very much in line with the third basic requirement of actorness, as presented 
earlier with reference to Bretherton and Vogler. In general, we believe that the EU 
fulfils all the five requirements of what constitutes an actor. From this perspective, the 
EU is clearly an institution with characteristics of a state. 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
On the basis of the above reasoning, we will in this project refer to the EU as an 
international actor with state-like features. Our interest solely focuses on the 
aggregated capabilities of the EU and therefore not the capabilities of the single 
member states. Still, we of course acknowledge that the individual member states are 
present – they are just not of our interest when determining the balance of power. In 
this  setting,  the  theoretical  framework  constructed  of  Waltz’s  balance  of  power  theory  
can be used to explain the assumed balancing the EU is performing with the 2004 
enlargement. When looking for balancing tendencies, we focus on the four 
capabilities presented earlier in this chapter. Each capability is linked to its own 
hypothesis. 
This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
1. EU asserts its authority over Russia through territorial expansion. 
2. The reference to security has been salient in the enlargement process. 
3. By achieving political stability in the candidate countries the EU diminishes 
Russian influence. 
4. EU  uses  its  economic  capabilities  to  limit  Russia’s  influence  in  the  candidate  
countries.  
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4. Analysis  
The structure of this analysis will be based on the four posed hypotheses. Each section 
will relate to one hypothesis, and through analysis of the empirical data, this section 
attempts to prove or disprove these. The sections of this chapter are categorised in the 
following order: population and territory, security, political stability, and economic 
capability. Throughout the analysis, events from the contemporary history of the EU-
Russia relationship will be included, when it is relevant for the interpretation of the 
empirical data. The individual sections will be presented on an equal level, although 
we are aware that the subjects are intertwined. The empirical data will be analysed 
with our theoretical framework in mind. We are aware that the prevalent academic 
approach, when analysing the European Union (EU), is radically different than the 
one we are taking on in this analysis. The neo-realist view may not be what we 
believe to be real, but it brings forth a different and relevant take on the topic. 
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4.1 Population and Territory  
The purpose of this section is to analyse the capabilities related to population and 
territory. First, a brief description of the enlargement in sheer numbers will be 
presented. Next, focus will be on the data specifically concerning the EU and its 
activities in the future territory. This will be exemplified through the case of 
Kaliningrad in the Baltic region, which is a hotspot for interaction between the two 
relevant actors, namely the EU and Russia. As the EU expands its territory, it is 
expected that tendencies of balancing must be present. Hence, this section will 
attempt to prove or disprove the following hypothesis. 
1. EU asserts its authority over Russia through territorial expansion. 
4.1.1 Enlargement in Numbers 
The EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 was unlike previous ones in both size and scope 
- it was the single largest expansion of the EU to date in terms of both territory and 
population. On that date, ten new countries with a combined population of 
approximately 74 million people became members of the EU. The total population of 
all the EU member states combined consequently rose from approximately 385 
million before the enlargement to 459 million after the enlargement (Eurostat, 2013a). 
The total population of the EU thus increased with almost 20 per cent. The 
enlargement  clearly  increased  EU’s  capabilities  in  terms  of  population,  i.e.  a  clear-cut 
tendency of balancing. 
In addition, the territorial area of the EU naturally increased with the enlargement as 
well. The territorial area of the ten new member states combined covered 738.532 
square kilometres. The EU went from covering a territorial area of close to 3.38 
million square kilometres before the enlargement to cover more than 4.1 million 
square kilometres after the enlargement (Eurostat, 2013b). The total area of the EU 
thus increased with 18 per cent. The territorial expansion of the EU consequently 
made the Union stronger in terms of territory capabilities. Simply put, the EU 
increased its territorial capabilities considerably. In this relation, it is worth noting 
that the 2004 enlargement included three former Soviet republics - namely Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. Additionally, the enlargement also included four former Soviet 
satellite states - namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. These 
seven countries combined had a total population of almost 71 million citizens at the 
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time of the enlargement, while they covered a total territorial area of 708.693 square 
kilometres. In other words, they made up a substantial part of the enlargement. The 
population and territory of these former Soviet countries consequently fell in the 
hands of EU in 2004, and the seven countries thus moved away from the sphere of 
Russian influence. The increase in territory, i.e. capabilities, is a clear balancing 
tendency. 
Looking at the current situation in Ukraine, it is clear that a substantial increase in 
size of territory and population is also at stake for the EU, since Ukraine is one of the 
largest states on the European continent. On top of that, Ukraine has a relatively large 
population consisting of 45.3 million people (Eurostat, 2013a). Ukraine could be a 
potential problem for the relationship between EU and Russia.  
4.1.2 The Baltic Region  
Now that the sheer size of the enlargement is established, the following will contain 
an analysis of how this increased capability expresses itself in practice. 
The Eastern borders of the EU were brought much closer to Russia with the 2004 
enlargement.  Already   at   the   beginning   of   the   1990’s,   signs were that the European 
powers asserted themselves as actors in what was to become new territory. In 1992, a 
Western European Union (WEU) conference addressed the presence of Russian 
troops in the independent Baltic States: 
“Ministers recalled that the presence of foreign forces on the territory of a 
sovereign state requires the explicit consent of that state. They stressed the 
importance of rapidly establishing, in the negotiations under way, timetables 
for withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the Baltic States”  
(Western European Union, 1992: 3). 
The statement shows that the WEU clearly does not accept the fact that Russia 
maintains its military disposals in sovereign states so close to its own territory. This 
might not just be a diplomatic statement of support for the Baltic States in dismissing 
Russia. The statement might also suggest that the EU is quick to publicly position 
itself in the wake of 1989, and consequently open up for future cooperation with the 
three post-Soviet states. The fact that the three Baltic States signed association 
agreements with the EU just three years later strengthens this argument (Europa.eu). 
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The association agreements must have diminished Russian influence rapidly, in what 
a few years prior to the accession-agreements was considered Soviet territory. Not 
only at that time but also in the future, this shows that the EU has increased its 
capabilities that possibly resulted in a decline for Russia. 
As   the   enlargement   process   develops   during   the   1990’s,   the   concern for future EU 
borders and the proximity to Russia is increasingly mentioned in the empirical data - 
especially from 1999 and onwards.  
An example of this can be seen at the European Council in Cologne in 1999, where 
the EU articulates the vision of a future cooperation: 
“Geographical proximity, as well as the deepening of relations and the 
development of exchanges between the Union and Russia, are leading to 
growing interdependence in a large number of areas. Only through common 
responses will it be possible to find solutions to challenges which are more 
and  more  often  common  to  both  parties” (The European Council, 1999a: 24). 
One  of   the  ways   in  which   this   cooperation  was   sought,  was   through   ’The  Northern  
Dimension’.3 The EU invited Russia, along with other states in the Northern 
European region, to participate in meetings concerning their common interests. 
According to the theoretical framework, an actor like the EU would never engage in 
joint initiatives unless it expects to gain more than its opponent. Inviting Russia to 
participate in the meetings is therefore not necessarily for the sake of genuine 
cooperation. It is more likely to be because the EU assumes to gain the most. In the 
geographical area that the Northern Dimension covers, both parties have great 
interests, but with the increase in territory the EU has equally increased it capabilities.  
In  multiple  cases,   the  EU  underlines  the  wish  for  cooperation  and  envisions  of  “(...) 
enhancing cross-border cooperation with neighbouring Russian regions (including 
Kaliningrad)”  (The European Council, 1999a: 29) it rings hollow, because the Union 
already has a great amount of influence in the Baltic region. With the 2004 
enlargement, the EU fully enclosed the Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia, in                                                         
3 The Northern Dimension is a EU-policy focusing on the geographical north-eastern corner of the 
Union. It has special focus on cooperation between current member states, acceding countries and third 
parties, i.e. Russia, in the region. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of the Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) are also invited to join. The policy was 
initiated in 1999 and renewed in 2006 (Eeas.europa.eu a). 
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practice forcing Russia to meet the EU and come to terms with an agreement 
concerning the borders of that area.  
At the European Council meeting in Cologne, it was further stated that:  
“The Union will support the strengthening of cross-border and regional 
cooperation and will prepare (...) actions directed at the enhanced 
involvement of EU programmes in Russian regions of special interest to the 
EU”  (The European Council, 1999a: 31).  
This is very much in line with the above. EU portrays itself as ready to cooperate with 
Russia, but there is clearly a cost for helping Russia solving its problem, i.e. to get 
more influence in the Kaliningrad region. This shows that the EU is aware of the 
increased capabilities it has gained through a territorial expansion and the use of these 
capabilities suggests balancing.  
The two accession countries, Poland and Lithuania, forms the new EU border to 
Kaliningrad, and it is in the negotiation between Russia, the EU and the two new 
members   states,   that   EU’s   increased   territorial   capability becomes clear. From the 
empirical data, it is evident that the main problem between the EU and Russia in this 
region is the borders between them. Prior to the 2004 enlargement, the access between 
Lithuania, Poland and Kaliningrad was relatively easy. This became complicated 
when the two countries, surrounding Kaliningrad, entered the Schengen-agreement. 
Russia was therefore clearly the one with the problem, while not much was at stake 
for the EU, since the flow between EU-territories was not endangered. This is very 
clear in a 2002 communication from the Commission to the Council. On the one 
hand, the EU offers cooperation and flexibility: 
“[The Commission assumes that] The Council wishes to explore all possible 
options for flexibility within the acquis, for movement of both people and good 
between   Kaliningrad   and   the   rest   of   Russia   (...)”   (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2002a: 2). 
The EU is supposedly very well aware of the effect that the enlargement will have for 
Russia in the Baltics, and it officially opens up for flexibility and pragmatism. In the 
document, it is also stated that: “(…)  the  study  does  not  start  from  the  premise  that  the  
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acquis  is  so  inflexible  that  it  cannot  cater  for  special  circumstances” 4 (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2002a: 2). This seems to be pure diplomacy, since the 
EU has no real interest in being flexible, as the EU have nothing to lose like 
mentioned earlier. Hence, the reality seems to be a different one when it comes to 
practice. In the same communication, it is also stated that: “At   the   same   time,  
whatever  “effective  and  flexible  solutions”  emerge  from  the  study  must  be  acceptable  
to  the  candidates”  (Commission of the European Communities, 2002a: 2). The EU is 
only flexible to a certain point, and wants to: 
“(…)  ensure  that  the  EU  and  its  current  and  future  Member  States  retain  their  
sovereign ability to ensure security and safety of all current and future EU 
citizens by controlling their borders and the movement of people and goods on 
their territory”  (Commission of the European Communities, 2002a: 2).  
The statement suggests that the EU is not ready to lie down flat and provide the 
Russian   authorities   with   any   special   rule   that   compromises   the   EU’s   authorities   in  
what is to become new territory. The primary goal for the EU is to secure its own 
borders, and not to please Russia. According to the communication from the 
Commission, Russia is aiming to sustain its border- and transport advantages in the 
Baltic  region  despite  of  EU’s  expansion  towards  the east. “[Mr.  Rogozin5] proposes 
that the EU and Russia adopt a political commitment to work towards the goal of via-
free   travel”   (Commission of the European Communities, 2002a: 2-3). The Russians 
also suggested non-stop trains between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. From the 
Russian perspective, the most ideal situation would at a very minimum be a status 
quo. Russia must aim at getting every inch of admission that it possibly can, in order 
to curb the EU influence in the region. This example shows that Russia is trying to 
counter-balance  EU’s  increased  authority  in  the  region.   
This was widely dismissed by the EU and the two relevant member countries to be; 
Poland and Lithuania: 
“[Poland]  does  not  consider  itself   to  be  a  transit  country”  while “Lithuania 
has indicated that for security and practical reasons it would not like to                                                         
4 The  ‘study’  that  is  referred  to is the communication itself, since it is a study of possible solutions for 
the issues concerning Kaliningrad and the surrounding countries.  
5 The Russian representative from Kaliningrad (Commission of the European Communities, 2002a: 2). 
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continue accepting internal passports as valid documents after accession. 
Lithuania would probably prefer not to extend the use of these passports the 
way Russia has suggested. Thus, if internal passports are to be accepted by 
Lithuania on a temporary basis after accession, it should be clear that their 
use must be phased out as soon as possible. Russia will have to accept and 
acknowledge  this  fact”  (Commission of the European Communities, 2002a: 3, 
5). 
In addition, the EU states that:  
“The visa requirement for Russian citizens will remain as long as Russia 
appears on the list of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders of the  Member   States   of   the   EU”  
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002a: 6).  
The statement indicates that the EU and its future member countries have no clear 
intention of granting Russia its wishes in the long run. The Union seems to be using 
its acquired authority and capabilities in the new EU-region to secure its influence in 
the new territory by securing its borders. This suggests increased capabilities, which 
the EU utilises greatly in the case of Kaliningrad, i.e. creating a balancing tendency. 
Russia   felt   the   implications   with   the   2004   enlargement.   However,   looking   at   EU’s  
interest in the Caucasus region, the tables might turn. Recently, in November 2013, 
Georgia and the EU initialled an association agreement, which is expected to be 
finally signed during 2014 (Eeas.europa.eu b). Georgia and Russia has had severe 
disputes in the past, with the latest being in South Ossetia in 2008. Thus, Georgia has 
no intention of joining the Russian customs union and it wishes to advance in its 
integration with the European community (Euractiv.com). If Georgia at some point in 
the future were to become a member of the EU, it would be quite isolated from the 
rest of the Union. With Armenia planning to join the Russian led customs union and 
Azerbaijan seemingly undecided on were to stand, the question is open 
(Panarmenian.net). A situation could arrive, where the EU has to accept Russian 
arrangements, since the EU influence would not be as firmly rooted in the region. 
This would also result in a balancing tendency, as the EU would increase its territory. 
But Russia may be able to maintain, or even increase, its authority in the area despite 
the  Union’s  rise  in  capabilities. 
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4.1.3 Sub-Conclusion 
The EU has gained both a larger population and a bigger territory, and thereby 
increased its capabilities, with the 2004 enlargement. Therefore, balancing is evident 
in terms of both areas of interest. In the enlargement process, the EU included seven 
countries with ties to the Soviet Union (and Russia) and the balancing thus favoured 
the EU in terms of population and territory. In the case of Kaliningrad, the EU clearly 
asserted its authority over Russia, thus proving our hypotheses. This section has 
shown that the EU uses its increased territorial capabilities in the case of Kaliningrad 
and tendencies of balancing thus become clear.  
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4.2 Security 
In this section, security will be analysed in a chronologically review of the relevant 
empirical data. Hence, this section seeks to explore whether there is a tendency of 
balancing to be found. Waltz points out that the actions of an actor can be just as 
important, as the assumptions that other actors make. Therefore, this part of the 
analysis will not focus on the actual accumulated military capabilities of the European 
Union (EU), but merely on the security capabilities (cf. Theoretical Framework). 
Finally, this section will attempt to prove or disprove the following hypothesis: 
2. The reference to security has been salient in the enlargement process. 
4.2.1 The Early Stages 
In 1991, new states were formed from the ashes of the Soviet Union and these states 
gradually tried to re-establish their internal control. The Soviet Union and the United 
States (US) were the dominant powers balancing each other during the Cold War, and 
therefore the collapse meant a massive change in balancing. The end of the Cold War 
also resulted in US retrenchment from the European continent.  
This analysis takes it point of departure in 1992, when the EU had not yet formed its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the absence of the CFSP, the 
Western European Union (WEU) acted as a European voice on security and military 
operations on the continent. 
This  seems  to  change  at  the  WEU’s  ministers  meeting  in  1992  in  Petersberg  where: 
“They  declared   that  WEU, together with the European Union, was ready to 
play   a   full   part   in   building   up   Europe’s   security   architecture” (Western 
European Union, 1992: 2).  
This  build  up  of  ‘security  architecture’  is   the  establishment  of  a  structure  within  the  
EU to address security issues. The statement expresses the readiness of the EU and 
the WEU to work together on security, meaning that the majority of the European 
countries would work together to solve security issues on their own continent. This 
statement comes at a time in history, where the international community is faced with 
the problems of Yugoslavia. Serbia and Croatia has declared their independence and a 
violent conflict erupts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was naturally a concern for 
the WEU. 
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At the Petersburg meeting, the WEU further states that “[Ministers]   discussed   the  
progress made in developing the role of WEU as the defence component of the 
European  Union   (…)” (Western European Union, 1992: 3). This suggests that the 
WEU is ready to transfer its capabilities to the EU, and become the component that 
the Union does not yet possess. It indicates that the EU is working towards being a 
capable actor when it comes to security issues.  
As shown in the theoretical framework, the EU can be seen as an actor that over time 
becomes an international player with state-like features. In these early stages, the EU 
must have been seen as an actor with few security capabilities that other states did not 
need  to  balance  against,  because  of  the  Union’s  lack  of  coherent  security  and defence 
policies.  This  shows  that  the  EU  uses  words  like  ‘security  architecture’  and  ‘defence  
component’   to  appear  as  an  actor  with  a  different  kind  of  authority than previously. 
Consequently, the attempt to increase capabilities in this specific area, slight as it is, is 
a dawning tendency to balance out other actors who possesses greater powers in this 
area, i.e. Russia. 
The establishing of the EU as an international actor with the ability to ensure its own 
security becomes apparent again in 1998. Two of the most influential states within the 
Union, namely France and the United Kingdom (UK) stated the following at the 
Summit in Saint–Malo: 
“1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union”  (EU  Institute  
for Security Studies, 2000: 1). 
This declaration of intent shows the road that France and the UK believe the Union 
should take. Both countries stress the importance of creating a credible military force, 
which  is  able  to  strengthen  the  Union’s  role  as  an  international  actor  with  the  ability  
to respond to crises (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2000: 1). This step seems very 
logical, since military power is absolutely crucial for a great power. 
However, France and the UK imply that this credible military force is only needed in 
order for the Union to take action when a crisis arises. In the context of the continued 
outbreak of violent conflict that continent was experiencing at that time, i.e. in ex-
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Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, if the EU establishes a military force, it can certainly be 
used for other purposes than crisis management, e.g. forceful coercion of other states 
and war, which thereby feeds the balancing tendency. With reference to the 
theoretical framework, this must be seen as an obvious power optimising that is being 
talked down, in order not to draw the focus of other actors. Whether or not the above 
will be followed through and established within near future is not an important factor 
when it comes to balancing there and then. Assumptions of balancing are just as 
important as actions, and if action is taken from one part the balancing may still be 
unintentional (cf. Theoretical Framework). If Russia assumes that the EU is 
establishing a military force, it will take this into consideration and act accordingly. 
This further underlines a tendency that balancing is taking place in this area. 
The notion of the EU as an actor that has a role to fulfil in the international 
community can also be seen at a meeting of the General Affairs Council in 1999, 
where “The   Council   discussed   in   detail   the   preparation   of   the   European   Council  
concerning   the   European   Security   and   Defence   Policy   (…)”   (European Council, 
1993: 8). This discussion of the preparations of the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) is important as France and the UK highlighted that the EU needs to be 
able to backup its position on the international stage with military forces. Ultimately, 
the European Council adopted the words from the Saint-Malo declaration by France 
and the UK in 1999. Thereby, the Union declares itself as an international actor with 
the capabilities to act within the field of conflict prevention and crisis management 
(The European Council, 1999a: 32-33). When the EU adopts the notion of becoming 
an international actor with military capabilities, it is clear that the Union is taking 
measures to ensure its own security. The theoretical framework claims that states 
operate within a self-help system. Therefore, the EU must be preparing to create 
security by optimising its ability to balance with states, which has the power to 
successfully attack them by military means. 
This can be seen in the establishing of guidelines  for  the  ‘Northern  Dimension’.  The  
European  Council  expressed  its  view  on  the  guidelines  for  the  ‘Northern  Dimension’  
to  be  “a suitable  basis  for  raising  the  European  Union’s  profile   in  the  region”  (The 
European Council, 1999a: 13). This is a continuation of the wish to fulfil an 
international role. The EU expects to play a more significant role following the 
enlargement, which makes the Union a closer neighbour with Russia and 
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consequently encloses Kaliningrad from all sides. Therefore, the expressed need for 
raising  the  EU’s  profile  in  this  region  is  a  question  of  asserting  its  rising  authority  to  
ensure security for an enlarged Union with increased proximity to Russia. 
Shortly  after  the  EU  established  guidelines  for  a  ‘Northern  Dimension’,  the  European 
Council made its presence known through the following statement: 
“Determined   to   lend   a   positive   contribution   to   security   and   stability   on   the  
European continent and in the light of recent developments as well as the 
Commission’s  reports,  the  European  Council has decided to convene bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 to begin negotiations with 
Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the conditions 
for  their  entry  into  the  Union  and  ensuing  Treaty  adjustments”  (The European 
Council, 1999b: 2). 
In the quote above, the European Council clearly makes a link between enlargement 
and security. The Union goes even further and makes the enlargement process of the 
EU a contributing factor in terms of security for the entire continent. The choice of 
words even suggests that the enlargement is a burden that the EU is willing to take on 
its shoulders, in order to ensure security for the entire continent, and not just for the 
EU itself. The Union presents this as a selfless act, but no such thing exists in a self-
help system. From a neo-realist point of view, this must be a mission the EU is only 
willing   to  embark  on,  because   it   increases   the  Union’s  capabilities  and  by   that   their  
ability to balance with powerful states on the continent, i.e. Russia. 
4.2.2 Security in a New Millennium 
In 2002, Javier Solana, the former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and  Security  Policy,  gave  a  speech  on  the  CFSP,  which  declared  that  EU’s  ambition  is  
to create a safer world (Solana, 2000: 1). He further stated that: 
“There is now a serious commitment to presenting a single political will to the 
rest   of   the   world,   a   commitment   to   match   Europe’s   economic   power   with  
political influence. This is the enormous change which we have witnessed in 
Europe over the last year“  (Solana,  2000:  2). 
31  
The  statement   suggests   that   the  development  of   the  EU’s  capabilities  does  not  only  
benefit the EU in fulfilling its role as an international actor. It also benefits other 
actors  because  the  EU’s  goal  is  to  ‘create  a  safer  world’.  Again,  this  indicates  that  the  
EU underplays its intentions as an international actor, but on the other hand it does 
not hold back when emphasising its capabilities - both economic power and political 
influence is mentioned. The statement thus shows a more outspoken attitude from the 
EU on the role they want to fulfil in both regional and international affairs, and the 
political influence that they now are able to use. Most importantly, it shows a 
continuation of balancing tendencies. More so, the Union portrays itself as an actor 
with rising capabilities and influence that will benefit the collective good of the 
world.  
This is further seen when accession negotiations were concluded with ten new 
member states, at a meeting of the European Council in 2002. The Union declared its 
success in ensuring the future security of the European continent, by stating that: 
“The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious 
process to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe. Today 
marks an unprecedented and historic milestone in completing this process 
with  the  conclusion  of  accession  negotiations  (...)”   (Council of the European 
Union, 2003: 1) 
Here, the successful negotiations, which lead to an enlargement of the Union with ten 
new members, are being linked with overcoming a previous legacy of conflict on the 
European continent. This makes the process of enlargement a way to end conflict on 
the continent and thereby ensuring security for the EU and all other European actors. 
Furthermore, the Union makes the enlargement process a way to end to the legacy of 
division. This legacy must be a reference to the former Cold War division where 
Russia and the US balanced each other through the Warsaw-pact and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Many of the accession countries are former 
members of the Warsaw-pact. Therefore, this is not an end of division of the 
continent, but merely an adjustment of the current division that favours the EU, i.e. 
tipping of balance. Once again, the emphasis on overcoming conflict and division 
underlines the link the EU makes between security (both in general and for 
themselves) and the enlargement process.  
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This is further implied by the mutual responsibility of old and new states in the 
Union:   “As fully fledged members of a Union based on solidarity, these States will 
play a full role in shaping the further development of the European project” (Council 
of  the  European  Union,  2003:  1).  Here,  the  word  ‘solidarity’  is  the  suggests  of  the  EU  
ensuring its own security through enlargement. As the ten new member states are now 
liable for both former and coming policies of the EU, the possibility of them aligning 
with  a  powerful  actor  like  Russia  is  no  longer  a  threat  to  EU’s  security.  Therefore,  the 
Union has, intentionally or not, been successful in marginalising Russia by making a 
future comeback for Russia in the new member states an unlikely scenario. 
4.2.3 Sub-Conclusion 
In this section, the hypothesis that there is a link between security and the 
enlargement process has been proven correct. This section demonstrates that security 
has been prominent when the EU has presented its reasons for the 2004 enlargement. 
In addition, it has shown a tendency that the Union is expanding its capabilities with 
reference to both ensuring its own security and the enlargement process. Therefore, 
the enlargement must be seen by other actors as an attempt from the Union to raise its 
accumulated capabilities and thereby ensuring its own security in the self-help 
system. These actions, when put in to connection with our theoretical framework, 
show tendencies of balancing within this area.  
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4.3 Political Stability  
The previous section showed that both people and territory, and security, have been 
important topics for the European Union (EU) throughout the period in question in 
connection with the 2004 enlargement. Simultaneously, political stability is often 
mentioned in relation to security. In other words, political stability seems to be an 
area of concern for the EU. Increase in capabilities and balancing can take place in 
different areas, and as Waltz points out political stability is one of these. Therefore, 
this section will show how the EU uses political stability in connection with the 2004 
enlargement. Hence, this section of the analysis will attempt to prove or disprove the 
following hypothesis:  
3. By achieving political stability in the candidate countries the EU diminishes 
Russian influence.  
4.3.1 Democracy as a Tool  
In 1993, when the European Council met in Copenhagen and constructed the so-
called  ‘Copenhagen  criteria’, the Union put forth the following requirements, which 
accession countries must fulfil: 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”   (The 
European Council, 1993: 8). 
When put into the historical context of violent conflict on the continent, this demand 
for political stability seems natural. The fear that one of the accession countries would 
experience the same dissolution as seen in Yugoslavia must have been a concern. The 
above statement is important, as the Union declares that stability is key in connection 
to membership. Evermore so, the stability in question is within the political sphere, 
where the most noticeable value is democracy. The link to democracy indicates that 
the EU demands political stability of the countries wishing to join, in order to ensure 
that they fully adopt all EU policies. Furthermore, when the accession countries enter 
the EU as members, the Unions policy framework will be superior to the local. This 
will affect the possible influence Russia can have over the candidate countries, as the 
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EU  at  any  point  can  overrule  a  local  policy,  if  it  does  not  fall  in  line  with  the  Union’s  
own policy. The demand for political stability in the accession countries must be seen 
as important for the EU, because members with political instability can pose a 
problem for the Union, i.e. they do not want to include countries with the same 
problems as Yugoslavia. Additionally, the EU uses democracy as the main tool to 
create political stability and make the new countries comply with the policy 
framework of the Union. In other words, this is a way for the EU to ensure its own 
survival after enlargement by making sure only countries with political stability, i.e. 
democratic countries, can be part of an enlargement and thereby not bringing 
instability into the EU.  
This EU commitment to create political stability is affirmed again in 1999, at the 
meeting of the European Council in Cologne. At this meeting, the EU takes its wish 
for political stability one step further, by not only demanding it of the accession 
countries but also encourage Russia to develop democracy. The EU makes it clear 
that  it  is  in  both  Russia’s  and  EU’s  best  interest  that  Russia  develops  as  a  democracy. 
Furthermore, the EU emphasises that the democratic development of Russia will be 
best   for   the   region   as   it   helps   “maintaining European stability, promoting global 
security   and   responding   to   the   common   challenges   of   the   continent   (…)”   (The 
European Council, 1999a: 22). Here, it is important to note that the EU links stability 
of the entire region with the spreading of democracy, and even tries to influence 
countries that do not wish to become members of the Union. The underlying aim for 
the EU seems to be promoting democracy in order to create a region with lasting 
political stability. In a self-help system, this is something the Union does because it is 
in its own best interest to ensure that there is no spillover-effect of political instability, 
which can negatively affect the Union. Moreover, there must be a fear that an 
unstable and non-democratic Russia is more likely to use coercive force on the 
accession countries, which are being drawn in to the policy framework of the Union. 
This is a tendency of balancing, as the EU, by drawing the accession countries closer 
and their fulfilment of the policy framework, is achieving greater influence over these 
countries and by this creating less room for Russian influence. It also seems that the 
Union becomes so confident with the achievements in the accession countries that it 
tries to influence Russia in this area. If Russia becomes more democratic from an EU 
perspective the stability of the continent will be safeguarded. 
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The aim of ensuring political stability is evident again in 1999, when the EU 
establishes  its  ‘Northern  Dimension’  policy.  The  EU  states  that  it  will: 
“(...)  contribute  to  the  reinforcement  of  positive  interdependence  between  the  
European Union, Russia and the other states in the Baltic Sea region, also 
taking into account the enlargement process and thus enhance security, 
stability   and   sustainable   development   in   Northern   Europe”   (European 
Council, 1999: 12). 
There is a clear link between the upcoming enlargement and the future stability of a 
part of the European continent. The enlargement is presented by the Union as a 
chance  to  enhance  stability  in  Northern  Europe,  which  is  in  everyone’s  best  interest.    
However, this cooperation must be in the best interest of the Union, as the EU is the 
initiator of the Northern Dimension. Geographically, Northern Europe is an area 
where the EU will obtain new borders with Russia with the expansion, and even 
surround the Russian Kaliningrad region. So when the EU presents the Northern 
Dimension as an initiative that will contribute to create stability for all the countries in 
the  area  in  light  of  the  enlargement,  it  is  a  question  of  making  EU’s  presence  known  
to other actors – in this case Russia. This is a balancing tendency, as the EU shows its 
rising influence and impact on political stability in the accession countries in Northern 
Europe and the declining room for Russian influence. Thus, the implementation of 
EU policies increases as the accession countries are moving closer towards EU 
membership. Here, the Union shows that its capabilities have equally increased, 
thereby balancing Russia. 
At a later meeting in Helsinki in 1999, the European Council:  
“(…)   confirms   the   importance   of   the   enlargement   process   launched   in  
Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity for the entire 
European continent. An efficient and credible enlargement process must be 
sustained (The European Council, 1999b: 1). 
Here, the EU underlines that the enlargement is vital for ensuring stability of the 
entire European continent. In the years up to the Helsinki meeting, the accession 
countries have shown improvement in terms of political stability, and there have been 
no violent incidents like that of Yugoslavia. If there had been, such a country would 
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not have been able to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria to an acceptable degree. 
Furthermore, the Union underlines its wish for an efficient process, which emphasises 
the importance of the enlargement happening within the foreseeable future. The 
statement from the EU almost makes it seem critically important for the entire 
continent that the enlargement process does not drag on - as if stability can be 
replaced by instability at any time, and furthermore that stability is conclusively 
secured the day the enlargement enter into force. In this way, the EU makes it seem 
like they are enlarging because it is beneficial for the accession countries and the 
continent as a whole. However, the enlargement, and the subsequent establishment of 
political stability, is in the best interest of the EU and it should not be seen as a move 
to help other states. The EU ensures its own stability and lessens possible negative 
effects of enlargement, by promoting democracy and political stability. This indicates 
tendencies of balancing since the EU, by promoting political stability in the accession 
countries, makes sure that their capabilities will not decrease with the enlargement. 
Furthermore, the accession countries will undergo a transformation of their internal 
structures in a vast amount of areas by adopting the EU policy framework. These 
changes are strongly in favour of the EU making the accession countries more 
compatible with the Union, and thereby diminishing the possibility of Russian 
influence. 
In 2002, at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen, the negotiations with the 
ten accession countries was successfully concluded. This marked an important 
achievement in the enlargement process and the EU pointed out that the “(…)  
achievement testifies to the common determination of the peoples of Europe to come 
together in a Union that has become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability 
and  prosperity  on  our  continent” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 1). 
In this statement, the EU attributes the achievement of democracy in a greater part of 
the continent to the peoples of Europe and not the Union itself. Once again, the EU 
underplays its role in the spread of democracy in order not to make the achievement 
an obvious gain for itself - but the gain is there. By accepting the superior EU policy 
framework the accession countries have chosen to align with EU, and thereby 
severing the ties with Russia. 
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The EU has, at this point in time, pushed politically instable states to become political 
stabile democracies, and future members of the Union. The capabilities have 
increased over this time period because the political stability has increased - this 
becomes more apparent and tendencies of balancing are thus evident. 
The EU goes further and states that: “(…)  the  current  enlargement  provides  the  basis 
for a Union with strong prospects for sustainable growth and an important role to 
play in consolidating stability, peace and democracy in Europe and beyond”  (Council 
of the European Union, 2003: 3). 
Here,   it   becomes   apparent   that   the  EU’s   ambition   for   the spread of democracy and 
political stability does not end with the enlargement in 2004, as it wants the same 
effect in a greater part of the European continent and beyond. This has been an 
ambition of the EU from the beginning, as showed earlier with the statements on 
democracy and Russia. 
As  the  EU  presents  its  security  strategy,  ‘A  Secure  Europe  in  a  Better  World’  in  2003,  
it is further emphasised that political stability, via promotion of democracy, forms 
great parts of the foundation for enlargement. The EU states that: 
“(…)  the  progressive  spread  of  the  rule  of  law  and  democracy  has  seen  
authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic 
democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision 
of a united and peaceful continent” (European Security Council, 2003: 
2). 
This suggests that the continued spreading of democracy in the rest of the continent is 
important for the EU. 
4.3.2 The EU beyond its Borders 
 It is apparent that the spreading of political stability is as tool for self-sustainment 
and   further   a  way   to   limit  Russian   influence  by   increasing   the  Union’s   capabilities.  
This   is   even  more   visible  when   looking   at   the  EU’s   activities   outside   the   group   of  
states that were acceded in 2004: 
 “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in 
the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. 
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Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where 
organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding 
population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The 
integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the 
EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well 
governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the 
borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and 
cooperative  relations”  (European Security Council 2003: 8-9). 
The EU is well aware that stability is not just an advantage to have in the member 
countries themselves, but also in the regions surrounding the Union. In the above 
statement, it is clear that it is a priority for the EU to have strong influence outside the 
Union  itself.  A  situation  where  the  EU  can  establish  a  politically  stable  “buffer  zone”  
around its area, in which it is not tied up in the same way as with member countries 
but still has a level of control, is very attractive for the EU. A clear example of this 
can be seen when briefly looking at the Balkans. At a council meeting in 2004, the 
EU described a mission in Macedonia that provided the country with support 
regarding:  
“[…]  consolidation  of  law  and  order,  including  fight  against  organised  
crime; implementation of the reform of the Ministry of Interior, 
including the police; transition towards and the creation of a border 
police; local policing and confidence building within the population; 
cooperation  with  neighbouring  States  in  the  field  of  policing”   (Council 
of the European Union, 2004b: 12). 
At this point in time, Macedonia was still to become an official candidate country 
(which happened a year after in 2005), but despite that fact the EU had financed a 
large-scale project on strengthening core structures. Georgia is another example of 
this. At the same Council meeting, it was noted that the Council approved a decision 
to start a mission in Georgia. The mission was “(...)  aimed  at  assisting  Georgia  in  the  
development  of  a  government  strategy   to  guide   the  reform  of   the  country’s  criminal  
justice   system”   (Council of the European Union, 2004b: 11). Again, these are 
structures with a deep connection to political stability. These are both examples of 
how the EU uses political stability as a tool, in order to secure its own survival further 
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beyond the official candidate countries. This suggest that the EU is trying to expand 
the influence they have achieved over the accession countries to other states, and 
thereby establishing a foundation for the same effect, i.e. limiting Russian influence 
and   consequently   increasing   the   Union’s   own   capabilities,   which   would   result   in  
continued tendencies of balancing.   
4.3.3 Sub-conclusion  
Through this section of the analysis, it is clear that EU connects political stability with 
security. In this relation, political stability has been an area of concern for the Union 
from the very beginning of the enlargement. By including political stability through 
democracy in the Copenhagen criteria, it becomes a tool for the EU in changing the 
political structures of the accession countries. Both in terms of internal stability in the 
Union, and in terms of Russian influence, this tool is in favour of EU. The 
achievement of political stability seemingly raises the security and diminishes 
Russian influence in the new EU member states – thereby indicating tendencies of 
balancing.   
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4.4 Economy 
This section will briefly focus on the trading relationship between the EU and Russia. 
Afterwards, the focus will be on how the EU draws in candidate countries to its fold 
through means of economic aid and consequently move them away from Russian 
influence - Poland and Lithuania will serve as examples of this process. The current 
situations in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine serves as indications of how this process 
persists after the 2004 enlargement. Finally, the area of Kaliningrad will be touched 
upon from an economic angle. Throughout the document, the analysis will be linked 
to the theoretical framework of balance of power. Hence, this section will attempt to 
prove or disprove the following hypothesis: 
4.   EU   uses   its   economic   capabilities   to   limit   Russia’s   influence   in   the candidate 
countries. 
4.4.1 EU and Russia – Asymmetric Trading Partners 
EU is an actor with significant economic latitude. It can easily be perceived as an 
economic superpower, because of its own currency and the fact that it plays a key role 
in international trade negotiations. In addition, the GDP of the EU is slightly larger 
than the US, twice as big as Japan or China and even several times bigger than 
Russia’s.  The  EU  is  the  biggest  exporter  of  both  goods  and  services  in  the  world,  and  
its internal market consist of close to 500 million citizens with a relatively high 
amount of spending power, which makes it attractive to many countries around the 
world (Cameron, 2012: 1, 8). In sum, the EU is in possession of strong economic 
capabilities. 
As for Eastern Europe, the EU is also a vital economic power in terms of both trade 
and aid. Especially Russia is dependent on its economic ties with the EU: 
 
“The  relationship  between  the  EU  and  Russia  has  primarily  an  economic  and  
security dimension. The EU is Russia’s   most   important   trading   partner  
(accounting for 40 per cent of its foreign trade, which will increase to more 
than 50 per cent after enlargement), its biggest investor, and its largest 
provider of aid. During the 1990s the EU was the only Western organisation 
that brought Russia closer to Europe, as it tried to engage Moscow on a 
variety  of  economic  issues” (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2002: 18). 
The  following  statement  clearly  shows  that  Russia’s  economy  is  reliant  on  its  trading  
relationship with  the  EU.  The  EU  is  Russia’s  most  important  partner  in  terms  of  trade,  
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investment and aid. The statement indicates that EU has used its economic 
capabilities to balance Russia, and more importantly the accession countries, closer 
towards the EU ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is an indication of 
that the EU aims to include the accession countries of Eastern Europe into its 
expanding economic project. Furthermore, a European Union Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS) document from 2002 claims that the forthcoming EU enlargement of 
2004   will   increase   Russia’s   foreign   trade   with   the   EU   by   10   per   cent.   It   is   not  
specified how this will happen and what variables those measures are based on. 
Therefore, it is easy to presume that the EU is trying to establish itself in a position 
towards Russia which implies that Russia cannot live without the financial support of 
the EU. However, while that might be true to some extent, the document does not go 
into details with how the EU is dependent on Russia.  
It can rightly be argued that Russia is in possession of a range of capabilities that the 
EU is dependent on. As an example, 63 per cent of the total value of EU imports from 
Russia in 2010 consisted of oil, while another 9 per cent consisted of gas. 
Furthermore, some EU member states rely heavily on coal from Russia (Eurostat, 
2011). In 2010, Russia even surpassed Saudi Arabia in terms of crude oil production 
and thus became the biggest producer worldwide (Eurostat, 2011). In 2012, energy 
from Russia accounted for more than three quarters of EU imports (Eurostat, 2013c). 
This clearly indicates that Russia is in possession of resource capabilities that affects 
the   balance   between   the   two.   Still,   Russia’s   economy   is   relatively   small   by   global  
standards. In 2010, the EU accounted for 25.8 per cent of the total world GDP, while 
Russia   only   accounted   for   2.3   per   cent   (Eurostat,   2012).   Russia’s   economy   is  
increasingly dependent on energy exports and an oil price slump can easily affect 
Russian economy in a negative way. On the other hand, goods exported from the EU 
to Russia are far more diverse. EU exports to Russia is primarily dominated by 
‘machinery  and  transport  equipment’,  which  makes  up  45  per  cent  of  the  total  exports.  
Other   important   categories   are   ‘chemicals’   and   ‘other   manufactured   goods’,   which  
makes up 18 per cent and 24 per cent respectively (Eurostat, 2011). This ultimately 
leaves Russia in a vulnerable position in terms of economic capabilities, compared to 
the EU. Balancing thus favours the EU in terms of their direct economic relationship.  
But balancing may come about in more indirect ways too. The following part will 
examine  how  the  EU’s  process  of  enlargement  for  candidate  countries,  namely  Poland  
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and Lithuania, may have affected the balancing process from an economic 
perspective. 
4.4.2 Poland and Lithuania 
In 1993, the European Council met in Copenhagen and in relation to future 
enlargement of the Union they stated that: 
 
“Membership   requires   that   the   candidate   country   has   achieved   […]   the  
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive   pressures   and   market   forces   within   the   Union” (The European 
Council, 1993: 13). 
 
The above excerpt, from what has now come to   be   known   as   the   ‘Copenhagen  
criteria’,   clearly   states   candidate   countries   must   adapt   to   EU’s   economic  
requirements, in order to become EU member states. This implies that former 
economic   policies  must   be   replaced  with   new   ones   that   serve   the   Union’s   internal  
market structure. In country reports focusing on pre-accession, the statement is 
referred to as the main economic criteria for candidate countries. However, the 
candidate countries do not have to fulfil these criteria solely by themselves. EU uses 
its economic capabilities to draw candidate countries   into  the  Union’s  political  fold.  
This primarily happens through the Phare Programme6.   In   2002,   the   EU’s  Regular  
Report  on  Poland’s  Progress  Towards  Accession  stated  that: 
 
“The  Phare  programme  allocated  commitments  of  €2  534  million   to  Poland  
during the 1992-1999   period,   €484   million   in   2000,   and   €467   million   in  
2001”  (Commission of the European Communities, 2002b: 13). 
 
The statement shows that the EU continuously provided financial aid in order for 
Poland to meet the Copenhagen criteria. This statement is a clear proof that the EU 
uses it economic capabilities to make candidate countries comply with EU standards. 
As  these  countries  comply,  they  move  away  from  Russia’s  sphere of influence. Thus,                                                         6 The Phare programme was originally  created  as  the  ‘Poland  and  Hungary:  Assistance  for  
Restructuring  their  Economies’,  which  is  the  main  financial  instrument  by  EU  for  accession  of  the  
Central and Eastern European countries, such as those with ties to Russia. (European Parliament, 
1998). 
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the EU uses its economic capabilities in favour of EU interests by winning over 
countries  such  as  Poland.  In  1997,  the  Commission’s  Opinion  on  Poland’s  application  
for EU membership concluded that: 
 
“Poland  can  be  regarded  as  a  functioning market economy; it should be well 
able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in 
the  medium  term”  (Commission of the European Communities, 1997: 114). 
 
The Commission conclusion thus states that Poland was moving towards meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria.   In   this   relation,   the  report  on  Poland’s  accession  progress   later  
stated that: 
 
“Hence,   it   is   concluded   that   Poland   is   a   functioning   market   economy.   The  
continuation of its current reform path should enable Poland to cope with 
competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the  Union”  (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2002b: 44).  
 
In 2002, Poland was thus more or less in line with the criteria. As Poland 
continuously  complied  with  EU’s  economic  standards,  they  naturally withdrew from 
Russia’s  economic  sphere  of  influence.  With  the  accession  of  Poland  as  a  EU  member  
state, Russian leverage in getting Poland to import its goods consequently diminished. 
Hence, balancing favoured the EU as Poland ultimately aligned with the Copenhagen 
criteria and the acquis. The same development applies to Lithuania, which had to live 
up to the same economic criteria as Poland. In the same manner, the 2002 Regular 
Report  on  Lithuania’s  Progress  Towards  Accession  concluded  that: 
 
“Hence,  it is concluded that Lithuania is a functioning market economy. The 
continuation of its current reform path should enable Lithuania to cope with 
competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the  Union”  (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2002c: 44). 
 
According to the report, Lithuania followed the same positive path towards accession. 
Furthermore, it also received significant economic assistance from the Phare 
programme from 1992-2001 – a   total   amount   of   €426  million   (Commission   of   the  
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European Communities, 2002c: 12). Just like Poland, Lithuania has complied with 
EU’s   economic   standards,   and   consequently   moved   away   from   Russia’s   economic  
sphere of influence. Lithuania also aligned with the Copenhagen criteria and the 
acquis. Therefore, balancing is also evident in the case of Lithuania. The balancing 
favoured the EU in this case too. 
Overall, both examples of Poland and Lithuania show that EU helps to restructure and 
shape the economies of the candidate countries, in order to ultimately gain control of 
them by including them as fully-fledged members of the Union. The examples also 
suggest that Russian influence in the candidate countries becomes diminished, as the 
countries are being integrated in the Union and aligns with the acquis. The EU 
enlargement consequently  has  a  negative  impact  on  Russia’s  economic  capabilities.  In  
other words, balancing tendencies becomes evident as the countries move from 
Russian   economic   sphere   of   influence   and   becomes   integrated   in   EU’s   economic  
structure. In this case it is vital to note, that Poland and Lithuania only represents two 
of the ten new members states in the 2004 enlargement. As previously noted, seven of 
these ten countries have historical ties to the Soviet Union. Both Poland and the so 
called   ‘Baltic   Tigers7’   have experienced vital economic growth ever since the 
enlargement  in  2004  (World  Bank,  2013).  Once  these  countries  are  in  EU’s  economic  
fold there is no turning back. The EU has managed to include the countries in their 
system and change their economies in a positive way, which ultimately boosts the 
aggregate EU economy. The aggregated loss for Russia, in terms of economic 
capabilities, thus becomes significant with the enlargement. This balancing process 
thus clearly favours the EU. Recently, Moldova and Georgia have signed a free trade 
agreement with the EU (Council of the European Union, 2013). The fact that Ukraine 
did not sign the same agreement has led to revolt against the government, as the 
Ukrainian population fear they will not experience the economic benefits that the EU 
has been able to provide elsewhere in the region. The Russian alternative is still on 
the table. This process indicates that the EU has intentions of expanding its economic 
project   further   into   Russia’s   sphere   of   influence   i.e.   a   possible future balancing 
tendency.  
 
                                                        7 The	  term	  ’Baltic	  Tigers’	  refers	  to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, due to their economic growth after the millennium.  
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4.4.3 Kaliningrad 
The aforementioned region of Kaliningrad has created a range of issues for the EU-
Russia relationship since the 2004 enlargement of the Union. Not only in terms of 
security and territory, as previously explored in the analysis, but also in terms of 
economic matters. As the region gets precluded from the rest of Russian mainland it 
automatically generates some issues in terms of inter-state trade. In 2002, a EUISS 
document  named  ‘A  new  European  Union  policy  for  Kaliningrad’  stated  that: 
 
“In   the   period   1994-1999   Tacis   provided   Kaliningrad   with   €16.8   million,  
which is a fraction of the assistance that Poland and Lithuania are receiving 
(hundreds of millions of euros in the same period), and also a fraction of the 
total  Tacis  assistance  that   flows  to  mainland  Russia  (€2  billion  since  1991)” 
(EU Institute for Security Studies, 2002: 22). 
 
The   document   refers   to   the   ‘Technical   Assistance   to   the   Commonwealth   of  
Independent   States’   (Tacis)   programme,   which   proved   grant-financed technical 
assistance to countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The statement above 
shows that the EU is not only providing technical assistance to candidate countries, 
like Poland and Lithuania, but also to specific regions of Eastern Europe. The fact that 
EU provides economic aid to Kaliningrad shows that EU has an economic interest in 
that specific region. Kaliningrad is a Russian region territorially cut off from Russian 
mainland and the statement thus hints that EU is using its economic capabilities, by 
providing financial aid, to balance the region in favour of EU interests. The fact that 
Russia accepts this aid indicates a sign of weakness in terms of Russian economic 
power. In relation, the Commission issued its strategy paper and report on 
enlargement in 2001, which stated that: 
 
“It  is  in  the  interest  of  the  EU  and  Russia  to  ensure  that  Kaliningrad  can  gain  
from  beneficial  economic  consequences  of  enlargement”  (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001: 8). 
The report claims that Kaliningrad should benefit economically from the upcoming 
enlargement. When reading between the lines, it becomes evident that the EU tries to 
establish  a  positive  picture  of  how  the  enlargement  should  benefit  EU’s  neighbouring  
regions, including Kaliningrad. However, it is not stated how and why this beneficial 
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outcome will become apparent. In contrast to the Commissions statement, the EUISS 
document notes that: 
 
“EU  enlargement  could  very  well  result  in  a  regional  asymmetry  of  economic  
and political weak and unstable states and strong and stable states. 
Kaliningrad will be on the outer side, held back in its development by the 
Schengen  regime  and  Russia’s  incapability,  whilst  Lithuania  and  Poland  will  
be inside the EU, attracting new investments and structural funds. The only 
viable strategy for Kaliningrad is to increase the level of economic 
development,   […]   augment   the   stable   provisions   of   energy,   boost  
competitiveness and attract investments, and finally merge into the economic 
space  of  the  EU”  (EU Institute for Security Studies 2002: 39). 
 
The EUISS document presents a significantly different picture of how the 
enlargement will affect Kaliningrad economically. The last part of the statement 
indicates that there is a range of policy measures that needs to be implemented in 
Kaliningrad, if the region should keep up with Lithuania and Poland in terms of 
economic development. Most importantly, the document states that Kaliningrad 
should   ‘finally   merge   into   the   economic   space   of   the   EU’.   This   statement   clearly 
shows that the EU seeks to integrate the Russian exclave into its own economic 
sphere. Hence, clear indications of economic balancing become evident in the case of 
Kaliningrad. 
4.4.4 Sub-conclusion 
The analysis in the section has showed that balancing takes place in numerous areas, 
when looking at economic capabilities. The EU and Russia share an interdependent 
relationship in economic terms. However, Russia is relatively weak to the EU in terms 
of economic capabilities and the Union seeks to balance this relationship further in its 
favour. Additionally, the examples of Poland and Lithuania shows that the EU is 
using its economic capabilities to expand their economic reach with the 2004 
enlargement. Balancing also favours the EU in this case. The current situations in 
Georgia,  Moldova  and  Ukraine   indicate   that   the  EU  is  moving  further   into  Russia’s  
sphere of influence. The last example of Kaliningrad furthermore indicates that the 
EU seeks to merge the region into the economic space of the EU and consequently 
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limit Russian influence. It can thus be concluded that the EU uses its economic 
capabilities to limit Russians influence in the candidate countries and beyond. In other 
words, the hypothesis has been proved correct.   
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5. Discussion 
The analysis has shown that tendencies of balancing take place in the areas of 
territory and population, security, political stability and economy. So far, the analysis 
has  primarily   focused  on   the  enlargement  processes   from   the  beginning  of   the  90’s  
and up to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU). In addition, the analysis 
has dealt with balancing processes from a EU perspective and it has been indicated 
that balancing favours the EU in most areas. However, it can rightly be discussed if 
balancing takes place elsewhere as the enlargement process continues. It can also be 
discussed how the relationship between the EU and Russia is, when looking beneath 
the surface of official documents published by various institutions within the Union. 
Up until this point focus has mostly been centred on EU statements concerning 
enlargement in 2004, which have provided a rather polished picture of the relationship 
between the EU and Russia. The following chapter will therefore discuss how the 
relationship can be viewed in the context of continued enlargement, with the findings 
from the analysis in mind. Hence, this chapter will go beyond the 2004 enlargement. 
In this relation, examples of countries that have a foot in both camps will be drawn in 
to explore the relationship more thoroughly. 
5.1 Beneath the Surface 
“The  EU  cannot  take  Russia  for  granted” 
 (European External Action Service, 2007: 7). 
This statement stems from the European External Action Service (EEAS) country 
strategy paper concerning the Russian Federation. The paper outlines a strategic 
framework for how the EU should approach Russia on a range of policy issues from 
2007 to 2013. In contrast to other documents used in the analysis, this paper suggests 
a more straightforward approach from the EU towards Russia. The  fact  that  ‘the  EU  
cannot   take  Russia   for   granted’   shows   that   the   relationship   between   the   two   is   not  
problem-free. The EU is concerned with Russian behaviour in several areas. 
In 2004, the Union launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to bring its 
immediate neighbours in east and south closer to the enlarged EU, through supporting 
reforms based on common values and interests, such as democracy and market 
economy (Cameron, 2012: 136-137). The ENP covers countries such as Ukraine, 
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Moldova and Georgia. However, it does not cover Russia. This is because Russia has 
made it clear that it does not want to be ranked alongside the other countries 
(European External Action Service, 2007: 6). Russia simply sees itself as more 
important. For this reason, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their cooperation by 
creating  the  four  ‘Common  Spaces’  at   the  St.  Petersburg  Summit  in  May  2003,  as  a  
part of their Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) from 1994.8 They 
include: The Common Economic Space, The Common Space of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, The Common Space of External Security, and The Common Space of 
Research, Education and Culture (Commission of the European Communities, 2007: 
6). The four Common Spaces have been a defining policy for the relationship between 
the EU and Russia ever since.  
However, progress towards achieving the Common Spaces has been met by a long 
range of obstacles along the way. EU legitimises its own actions through the 
promotion of democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and the respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. These essential EU values do not reflect Russian 
behaviour in many issues of foreign policy. The EU often refers to the conflict in 
Chechnya, stating that the conflict has provoked widespread humanitarian problems, 
which has consequently let to the abuse of human rights, and threatened the rest of the 
North Caucasus region to become more politically unstable. The North Caucasus 
region has, among many problems, been characterised by socio-economic inequality, 
massive unemployment, a largely destroyed civilian infrastructure in Chechnya, and 
poor application of the rule of law  (European External Action Service, 2007: 3, 8; 
Cameron, 2012: 89). Russian behaviour in dealing with this these problems has not 
been acceptable according to EU standards, and the destabilisation of that region 
remains an issue for the EU-Russian relationship. In its 2008 review of EU-Russia 
relations, the Commission states that:  
“[There   has   been]   a   backdrop   of   developments   that   have cast a serious 
shadow  over  the  EU  Russia  relationship:  the  violation  of  Georgia’s  territorial  
integrity  with  the  use  of  force,  and  Russia’s  unilateral  recognition  of  Abkhazia  
                                                        
8 The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) established the formal legal basis for EU-Russia 
relations in 1994. The agreement encompassed a fairly broad agenda of integration between Russia and 
the EU in a wide range of fields (Kulhanek, 2010: 53). The PCA expired in 2007, while the four 
Common Spaces are still in effect. 
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and   South   Ossetia   remain   unacceptable”   (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008: 2). 
Progress towards implementing the Common Spaces will be limited, as long as 
insurgency prevails in that area. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia 
did no good for the EU-Russian relationship. The then French Presidency of the EU 
tried to mediate the conflict, especially through the voice of former president Nicolas 
Sarkozy. Although Sarkozy acted on behalf of the EU in his activities during the war, 
he did not enjoy the support from many other EU governments. While the Russian 
government accepted the French initiative to solve the conflict, it was not fond of the 
increasing number of EU activities in its area of interest. Instead of dealing with the 
EU as a whole, Russia chose to solve the conflict through bilateral means by 
cooperating with France (Kulhanek, 2010: 54, 59). This example suggests that Russia 
prefers to do bilateral negotiations with single EU member states, rather than with the 
EU as a whole. In this way, it can trigger internal disputes between EU member states 
and thus diminish the Unions ability to act in a collective and decisive manner, i.e. as 
a single entity. This ultimately leaves Russia in a stronger position in terms of being 
in control of its own backyard. Moreover, it indicates that there is a potential for 
further change in capabilities and ultimately balancing between the two. If the conflict 
in Georgia should rekindle sometime in the future, the relationship between Russia 
and EU will be put to a test. Both Russia and the EU acknowledge that they share 
mutual interests, especially in the field of economics. The question is how vital this 
relationship  is  in  contrast  to  the  EU’s  fundamental  values  of  democracy,  human  rights  
and freedom of speech. While the EU cannot ignore the current situation in Caucasus, 
it should act with care if Russia decides to step up its presence in that area. The same 
applies to Russia the other way around. 
5.2 Collision of Policies 
Russia likes to present itself as a great power in international relations (IR) – “Russia  
is still driven by a great-power mentality that tends to view developments as a zero-
sum  game”  (Cameron,  2012:  148).  This  is  evident  in  Russia’s  Middle  Term  Strategy  
on the European Union from 1999, which states that: 
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“As   a   world   power   situated   on   two   continents,   Russia should retain its 
freedom   to   determine   and   implement   its   domestic   and   foreign   policies”  
(Russian Federation in Kulhanek, 2010: 54) 
The above quote states that Russia wants to maintain its great power status in global 
politics. This should of course be seen in contrast to other actors in a world order 
characterised by multipolarity, seen from a Russian point of view (Kulhanek, 2010: 
55). In this world order, the EU is another significant actor. While the two actors 
formally wish to cooperate, there are some clear indications that their policies and 
values do not play well together. In 2005, the Russian president Vladimir Putin 
indicated his intention to bolster democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
– all of which are key to EU policy  (European External Action Service, 2007: 7). 
However,  EU’s  view  on  what  should  be  considered  as  stable,   free  and  secure  varies  
from that of Russia. In this relation, the aforementioned EEAS document states that: 
“Russia  is  characterised  by  a  powerful  bureaucracy,  a  politically-biased legal 
system, powerful and repressive law enforcement agencies and a relatively 
weak  civil  society”  (European External Action Service, 2007: 3) 
In   other   words,   Russia’s   political   system   does   not   live   up   to   EU’s   democratic  
standards. A politically biased legal system and repressive law enforcement agencies 
do   not   fit   well   with   what   EU   considers   to   be   good   governance.   Vladimir   Putin’s  
emphasis on democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms therefore rings 
hollow  in  EU’s  view.  The  EU  even takes it criticism further by stating that: 
“[In  Russia] European observers tend to see state dominance of the economy 
– notably of oil and gas – for private interest, the corruption of the 
bureaucracy, increased control of civil society, and the lack of independent 
media. The murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya has done nothing to allay 
such concerns, while recent changes in the law on NGO registration may 
further discourage the emergence of a true civil society in Russia. More 
prosaically, many observers consider that the inertia of the large Russian 
bureaucracy   will   handicap   reform   efforts   in   general”   (European External 
Action Service, 2007: 7). 
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All of the aspects mentioned in the above quote underline the fact that Russia does not 
align with the fundamental values that the EU advocates in its policy. Hence, it 
becomes difficult for the EU and Russia to implement their visions of mutual 
cooperation  in  practice.  EU’s  foreign  policy  towards  Russia  relies  heavily  on  sharing  
the same fundamental values, i.e. the values of the EU itself. Nevertheless, Russia 
does not like to be lectured by the rather normative and value-driven approach that the 
EU  represents.  The  EU’s  normative  approach  conflicts  with  Russia’s  view  of  being  a  
great power with a sovereign right to determine its own policies – both domestically 
and abroad. Still, the EU continues to emphasise the importance of its values when 
dealing with Russia (Kulhanek, 2010: 56). This might be a problem for future 
cooperation, as the EU increases its capabilities through enlargement. 
In relation to these conflicting views on policies, Russia is particularly concerned 
about   the   EU’s   continued   enlargement   towards   the   east,   e.g.   when   Bulgaria   and  
Romania joined in 2007. This is evident in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation from 2008, which emphasises that: 
“Integration   processes,   including   in   the   Euro-Atlantic region, are often of 
selective and restrictive nature. Attempts to lower the role of a sovereign state 
as a fundamental element of international relations and to divide States into 
categories with different rights and responsibilities, are fraught with 
undermining the international rule of law and arbitrary interference in 
internal  affairs  of  sovereign  States”  (Russian Federation, 2008: 3). 
When reading between the lines, it becomes clear that the Russian government 
complains   about   the   EU’s   continuous   enlargement.   This   process   ultimately  
diminishes the role of Russia in regional areas it considers as its natural sphere of 
influence. The Russian government must be concerned that balancing processes, 
which derives from the EU enlargement, will not favour their interests. Therefore, 
Russia’s  self-portrayed picture as a significant power in IR crumbles every time EU 
takes a piece of its pie. Russia is clearly aware of this fact. Once again, the example of 
Kaliningrad is worth noting in this relation. The EEAS document states that: 
“Because   surrounded  by  EU  Member   States,   the  EU  maintains   a   particular  
interest in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Its objective is to ensure that the potential 
for socio-economic development of Kaliningrad and the surrounding region is 
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fulfilled   (…)   [The   EU  wants]   to   promote   a   ring   of   well-governed countries 
surrounding the EU with whom close and cooperative relations can be 
enjoyed. If the regions adjacent to Russia are not stable, this will have 
consequences   for   the   security   of   the   EU   itself”   (European External Action 
Service, 2007: 5). 
As shown in the analysis we found balancing tendencies in connection to political 
stability and security. The quote above shows that this seems to be an aspect of 
concern to the Union in connection to the region of Kaliningrad as well. Even though 
Russia and the EU strives to cooperate in making Kaliningrad a stable and prosperous 
region, there are still some difficulties in making this reality. It is further noted that: 
“The  EU  is  concerned  that  the  Kaliningrad  exclave  may  skew  the  development  
of  the  Baltic  region  (…)  It  remains  difficult  to  do  business  in  Kaliningrad  due  
to centralisation and bureaucracy” (European External Action Service, 2007: 
8). 
The aforementioned EU criticism of Russia being characterised by a powerful and 
biased  bureaucracy   is   thus   conflicting  with  EU’s   interest   in   the  Kaliningrad   region.  
The  EU  is  concerned   that  Russia’s tough stance in that area might affect the rest of 
the region negatively – both businesswise in terms of economy, but also in terms of 
political stability and security. As Kaliningrad is situated between Poland and 
Lithuania, the EU is accordingly concerned that an unstable Russian region will have 
a negative impact on its own territory. However, Russia emphasises its sovereign 
right to defend its interests in that region, despite continuous EU enlargement. 
Overall, the region of Kaliningrad will remain a vital test for the EU-Russian 
cooperation in time to come. 
5.3  The  “Remaining”  Countries 
The collision of interests and policies has been a major flaw in the EU-Russian 
relationship. The EU continues to expand their territory with its enlargement 
processes  while  Russia  struggles   to  protect   its  sphere  of   influence.  Russia’s  greatest  
fears   concern   the   possibility   that   EU’s   political   activity   will   continue   in   states   in  
Russia’s   sphere   of   interest.   In   addition,   Russia   fears   that   some   of   these   states,  
particularly Ukraine, would accede to the EU in a long-term perspective. 
Furthermore, both actors continue to evolve in opposite directions because of the 
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conflicting political values and interests (Kaczmarski, 2005: 2). Even though Russia 
claims to develop closer ties with the West on the basis of common democratic 
values, it still seeks to restore influence over states in its sphere of influence through 
various means. The 2004 presidential election in Ukraine constitutes an example 
hereof.  
During the elections, the Russian government supported their favoured candidate, 
Viktor Yanukovych, with political advisers and publicity on Russian television. In 
addition, the Russian president Vladimir Putin personally intervened in the campaign 
with visits and a television speech, while also assisting in harassing the opposition, 
and supplying finance to Yanukovych (Fraser, 2005). However, the Russian favourite 
did not win the election. The rival candidate, pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko, won the 
election  after  the  ‘Orange  Revolution’,  which  led  to  a  second  ballot  because  the  first  
results were accused of being rigged. The EU, through the voice of Javier Solana, 
joined with the presidents of Poland and Latvia to make sure that the Orange 
Revolution had a peaceful outcome (Cameron, 2012: 148). This indicates that the EU 
had an interest Ukraine as well.  
Russia was obviously not satisfied with the final result. Since the Orange Revolution, 
Russia and Ukraine have been involved in several gas disputes, which have evolved 
into transnational political issues because a vast amount of the European gas supplies 
are transported through Ukraine. Russia is in a position to do serious economic harm 
to   Ukraine   due   to   the   fact   that   it   controls   all   of   Ukraine’s   sources   of   oil   and   gas  
(Fraser, 2005). If a future gas dispute between the two should emerge, it will result in 
a new test of the EU-Russia relationship, which might lead to further political 
controversy and polarisation. In such a scenario, it is not unlikely that the EU will 
unite and speak with one voice. On the one hand, Russia knows that the EU is heavily 
dependent of its oil and gas supplies, which is something that Russia might use to its 
advantage. On the other hand, Russia has to sell its oil and gas to keep the wheels 
going and the EU is of course aware of this fact. Therefore, a future gas dispute seems 
unlikely. But Russia surely fears that the some states in its sphere of interest might 
turn around and accede to the EU. Especially Ukraine is of serious concern in this 
relation. 
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As mentioned in the analysis, the EU has just signed a new free trade agreement with 
Georgia and Moldova, which shows that both countries are turning towards the EU. 
At the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on 29 November 2013, President of the 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, held a speech in which he stated that: 
“We  may  allow  ourselves  a  moment  to  draw  breath,  to  celebrate  and  to  gather  
strength before proceeding further on our journey together. Perhaps, it is the 
word  “together”  that  is  now  the  most important.  (…)  Finally,  be  assured  that  
the EU will stand with you. This is a joint endeavour. We have an interest in 
your success. We too will profit too from your advancement, your stability and 
your security. I am convinced that our joint efforts will be rewarded with 
greater  security  [and]  accelerating  economic  development  (…)  I  look  forward  
to  travelling  this  road  with  you!”  (Commission of the European Communities, 
2013). 
Barroso links the achievement of the new agreement to elements of security, stability, 
and economy – all of which are key in a balancing perspective as shown in the 
analysis. However, Ukraine has not been able to sign any agreement with the EU so 
far. If Ukraine should join the EU as a part of a future enlargement, it will have severe 
consequences  for  Russia’s  influence  in  the  Europe.  Right  now,  hundreds  of  thousands  
of people are protesting in the streets of Kiev trying to convince the Ukrainian 
government that the EU alternative is better than the Russian. The outcome of the 
protests remains unknown. In a Waltzian view, this case validates the fact that 
balancing is always taking place. The relationship between Russia and the EU will 
continue to be affected by this process. 
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this project has been to examine which balancing tendencies that can be 
traced in the process leading up to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU). 
This has been done by using a theoretical framework, which is inspired the neo-realist 
theory   on   ‘balance   of   power’   as   presented   by Kenneth Waltz. In order to trace 
balancing, the EU has been treated as an actor with state-like features, although this 
stand   is   rather   controversial.   On   the   basis   of   Waltz’s   theory,   we   extracted   and  
modified four categories based on the relevance of our study. These were: population 
and territory, security, political stability and economic capability. Each of the 
categories were linked to a hypothesis, which were used to structure the analysis. 
The first section of the analysis showed that the EU asserts its authority over Russia 
through territorial expansion. This was particularly evident in the case of Kaliningrad. 
Furthermore, the EU has gained both a larger population and a bigger territory, and 
thereby increased its capabilities, with the 2004 enlargement.  
The second section of the analysis showed that the reference to security has been 
salient in the enlargement process. The section demonstrated that security has been 
prominent when the EU has presented its reasons for the 2004 enlargement. In 
addition, it showed a tendency that the Union is expanding its capabilities with 
reference to both ensuring its own security and the enlargement process. 
The third section of the analysis showed that the EU diminishes Russian influence by 
achieving political stability in the candidate countries. In this section, it was clear that 
the EU connects political stability with security. By including political stability 
through democracy in the Copenhagen criteria, it became a tool for the EU to change 
the political structures of the accession countries. The achievement of political 
stability diminished Russian influence in the new EU member states. 
The fourth section of the analysis showed that the EU uses its economic capabilities 
to  limit  Russia’s  influence  in  the  candidate countries and beyond. Russia is relatively 
weak to the EU in terms of economic capabilities. The examples of Poland and 
Lithuania showed that the EU is using its economic capabilities to expand their 
economic reach with the 2004 enlargement. The case of Kaliningrad indicated that the 
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EU seeks to merge the region into the economic space of the EU and consequently 
limit Russian influence.  
In sum, the findings of the analysis confirmed that balancing tendencies can be traced 
in all four areas, when looking at the process leading up to the 2004 enlargement of 
the EU.  
In continuation of the analysis, the discussion dealt with how the relationship between 
the EU and Russia can be viewed in the context of continued enlargement. Hence, the 
discussion went beyond 2004. In this relation, it was explored that the relationship 
between the EU and Russia is negatively affected due to collision of policies and 
continued enlargement. Balancing continues beyond the 2004 enlargement, and the 
current development in Ukraine shows that the EU and Russia continues to fight over 
influence on the European continent.  
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7. Reflections 
The following section will present reflections on the project, and suggest an 
alternative theoretical approach to the 2004 enlargement. 
7.1 Further Enlargement of the Union? 
An obvious continuation of this project would be to use the same theoretical 
framework and the same hypotheses and test them in connection to the enlargement of 
2007. Are the stakes the same as in 2004? Which balancing tendencies can be found? 
A broader perspective could also be explored, by focusing on future enlargement of 
the European Union (EU). In the summer of 2013, Croatia became the 28th member of 
the Union, while Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are still 
negotiating for membership. Lastly, the EU has promised Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Albania and Kosovo the prospect of joining the Union. (Ec.europa.eu) With the 
possible accession of the Balkans, the EU will encompass a region of Europe that has 
had great problems with stability and a history of Russian influence. Even though the 
1990’s  Balkan  wars  have  ended,   there  are  still  borders  that  are  not  agreed  upon  and  
ethnic groups that are not getting along. These are of course problems that EU has to 
address. The hypotheses posed in this project could then be tested in a new setting 
with special focus on political stability would be acutely relevant. Would an accession 
of these countries be an advantage to the EU in a balancing game and would Russia 
be able to put a stop to further enlargement? Another interesting region in possible 
new EU territory is Turkey. Applying for membership in 1987 and with no date set 
for accession yet, it is very unclear whether Turkey will ever become a part of the 
Union. Taking our theoretical framework and investigating the security-related issues 
with an expansion in the southeast, would also be very relevant from a balancing 
point of view. An accession of Turkey would make Syria, Iran and Iraq neighbours of 
the EU, which consequently would create a difficult situation in terms of borders and 
regional conflict. Which balancing tendencies are to be found in connection with 
enlargement towards the Middle East? 
 
Another perspective, still within the neo-realist tradition, could be the focus on the 
states within the Union. Another interpretation is that the EU cannot be treated 
analytically as a state, but the focus should rather be on the great powers within the 
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Union. This view is more in line with neo-realism, and the lack of a EU military is the 
main argument within this thought. With Waltz in mind, these states would not be 
engaging in the Union unless they gained from it themselves. The Franco-British 
meeting in St. Malo in 1998, is a good example of this – two of the major European 
powers are orchestrating the EU and not the other way around. The interpretation 
could be that the great European powers are merely using the EU as a forum for 
securing their own interests. An analysis of how the 2004 enlargement can be seen as 
tool for the states such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany in their own 
balancing could therefore be very relevant. 
 
7.2 The EU as a Normative Power 
All the above is linked to the thoughts of neo-realism. But what if we were to see the 
2004 enlargement in a completely different light?  Ian Manners has suggested that the 
EU should be viewed as a normative power, and that a lesser focus should be put on 
e.g. the military capabilities of an entity. Instead of asking how the EU uses 
enlargement as a way of balancing by increasing it capabilities, we should rather ask 
how the EU diffuses its norms. As Waltz set up a number of capabilities, so has 
Manners set up of structure from which to understand how the norms are spread: 
contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion 
and cultural filter (Manners, 2002: 244-245). A different take on an analysis of the 
2004 enlargement could take its point of departure in an investigation of either all or a 
couple of these categories This would paint a picture of how the EU uses enlargement 
as a way of spreading its norms and values on the European continent. For instance, 
with procedural diffusion, which is found in the institutionalisation between the EU 
and a third part, the focus would be on analysing the different agreements that EU and 
potential member countries enters. This project has touched upon the values set up in 
the Copenhagen criteria, but it would be relevant to trace these values in the 
negotiations themselves. With overt diffusion, which is diffusion through actual 
presence in a third party area, the focus would be European missions into non-
member countries. This project has briefly mentioned EU presence in third states, but 
the either the EU missions in the Balkans or the monitoring mission in Georgia would 
be relevant to put even more focus on. A lot of the angles that this project explores, 
would therefore also be explored in a project researching EU as a normative power. 
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Our analysis on political stability, and the links it has with EU values in general, is a 
good example of where an approach inspired by Manners could bring an interesting 
and relevant angle to the 2004 enlargement. 
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